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NOTES
COMPUTER-AIDED MEDICINE:
PRESENT AND FUTURE
ISSUES OF LIABILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The use of computers has become integral to the development of
modern medicine. Computers are used to schedule appointments, maintain inventory lists of drugs, bill patients, and store medical records.
More sophisticated computers are used to produce computerized axial
tomographs (C.A.T. scans) and to monitor electrocardiograms continually in intensive care units.' An expanding area of computer application in the medical field is the use of expert systems to perform
diagnostic functions. Expert systems, also referred to as artificial intelligence, are computer software systems that incorporate human expertise into their programs. In developing expert systems, researchers
input the knowledge of experts into computer programs, enabling them
to reach the same conclusions as the experts, using the same cognitive
methods. 2 These expert systems can ask questions, discard irrelevant
information, and produce a reasoned conclusion with a credible explanation of how that conclusion was reached. 3 When computers are used
in the medical field, patients can be injured if the systems are defective
or if the person using and interpreting the information is negligent.
This Note addresses liability in computer-aided medicine, focusing
on expert systems currently used in diagnostics as well as future uses
for computers in medicine. Presently, hospitals use expert systems to
aid physicians and other medical personnel in the diagnosis and monitoring of patients. It is anticipated that expert systems for home diagnostic use also will become a reality in the near future. Other uses for
1. See Brannigan & Dayhoff, Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective
Medical Computer Programs,7 AM. J. L. & MED. 123, 127 (1981) [hereinafter Brannigan &

Dayhoff].
2. See Shurkin, Expert Systems: The PracticalFace of Artificial Intelligence, TECH.
RIv., 72, 74 (Nov. 1983).
3. See Comment, Medical Expert Systems:

HIGH TECH. L.J. 483, 484 (1986) (authored by Gill).

Grappling With Issues of Liability, 1
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computers and expert systems are developing in the new biology area.
"New biology" refers to certain new biological technologies rapidly developing in the medical field including new methods of human reproduction and complex technologies for prolonging life, such as organ
transplantation. Computer systems that network information about organs available for transplant already have been developed, and it is conceivable that similar systems could be implemented to assist physicians
in other areas of new medicine, such as searching for compatible surrogate mothers. In anticipation of these computer systems, it is useful to
analyze the applicability of traditional tort theories of liability when injuries result.
Based on public policy and fairness rationales, this Note argues that
manufacturers of mass-produced computer systems should be held to a
strict liability standard for defectively produced systems. A negligence
standard should govern when a computer system is custom-made or
when a physician's services are used in conjunction with the system.
Two very likely defendants in a lawsuit for personal injuries are
the program manufacturers and the doctors and/or hospitals that use
these systems. This Note focuses on liability pertaining to these two
classes of defendants. In assessing the appropriate theory of liability,
one must first determine whether the expert system or computer program is considered a product or a service, and whether a physician's
services intervened.
When a physician uses a computer system and injury results to his
patient, the plaintiff should be allowed only to use a negligence or professional liability theory against the physician. If the system were specifically tailored for a physician and found to be defective, the plaintiff
also might use a negligence claim to hold the programmer liable for his
services. However, if the plaintiff were injured due to a manufacturing
defect in the program, he could bring a strict products liability cause of
action against the manufacturer.
When an expert system is mass produced without customization
and sold for in-home diagnostic use, strict products liability should apply. In the new biology area, computer networking systems may be vitally important. A strict products liability standard would then be too
inhibitive of new production. If a vital service were involved, policy rationales may dictate a liberal negligence standard in order to encourage
4
development in this new area.
4. A liberal negligence standard requires a finding of "gross negligence" or "recklessness" as opposed to ordinary negligence. The jury might also be instructed that since
this is a new area of technology, the "due care" required differs from that in established
medical procedures.
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A.

How

EXPERT SYSTEMS WORK AND EXAMPLES

Expert systems also are referred to as artificial intelligence because
of their ability to use judgmental knowledge or "heuristics."'5 The word
heuristics comes from the Greek word for "discover" but is simply expressed as "the art of good guessing."'6 Heuristics combines knowledge
with the rules of thumb that human experts gain from experience in
solving problems. Heuristics enables experts, human or machine, to
recognize promising approaches to problems, to break problems into
smaller ones, to get around incomplete data, and to make educated
guesses when necessary. 7 Deductive principles which have been extracted from human experts into models of clinical problem solving are
logically applied to the data entered into the computer system.8 Many
of these systems use an "if-then" induction statement which takes the
form of a conditional. These if-then rules increasingly narrow a search
by guiding the program's attention to the correct solution.9 For example, IF running nose, temperature, and sneezing are present, THEN patient has a cold; IF the patient has a cold, THEN prescribe aspirin.' 0
The developers of expert systems realized that the computer had to be
able to weigh decisions by their plausibility." The conclusion reached
by the series of rules is accepted when a numerical scoring factor exceeds some critical threshold. 12 The program actually prioritizes possible decisions by using its deductive principles to come up with the most
plausible solution.
One of the first expert systems developed was "MYCIN" by Edward Shortliffe of Stanford University. MYCIN diagnoses blood and
meningitis infections and advises physicians on antibiotic therapies.
MYCIN is an example of a professional system which is designed to
augment a physician's own personal skill and reasoning. 13 It uses a base
of 500 heuristic rules to diagnose bacterial blood infections. The "CADUCEUS" program at the University of Pittsburgh is another expert
system. It is designed to diagnose more than 800 diseases. An important step in artificial intelligence development is the trial-and-error con5. See Schwartz, Patil & Szolovits, Artificial Intelligence in Medicine Where Do We
Stand?, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 362, 363 (1987) [hereinafter Schwartz]. These authors assert
that rule-based systems incorrectly have been termed "artificial intelligence."
6. Shurkin, supra note 2, at 74.
7. See id.
8. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 363.
9. See Buetel, Government Regulation of Diagnostics Software: A Threat to Artificial Intelligence Software Developers, 2 COMPUTER LAW. 22, 23 (1985).
10. See Shurkin, supra note 2, at 74.
11. See id. at 75.
12. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 363.
13. See Comment, supra note 3, at 487.
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sultation between expert and programmer which codifies the hundreds
of rules and exceptions that human experts learn from theory and practice.' 4 The generalized logic of the MYCIN system is like a skeleton
which could be separated from the medical database and connected to a
new database from other fields.
Another system named "INTERNIST" has a large database that includes information on about 500 diseases which constitute about seventy-five percent of all major medical diagnoses. In clinical tests, this
system correctly diagnosed as many cases as most ordinary physicians.' 5
While many of these systems are in the developmental stage, some are
used on a day-to-day basis. "PUFF," an offshoot of MYCIN, is now being used at the Pacific Medical Center in San Francisco to diagnose lung
6
disease.'
B.

EXAMPLES OF HOME-USE EXPERT SYSTEMS

Home medical diagnostic expert systems, not in use at this time,
would function like those used in hospitals or doctors' offices, but would
be produced with family use in mind. Hypothetically, the user enters
his symptoms into the computer. The computer then selects relevant
principles based on the input, asks questions to find out any additional
pertinent facts, and generates answers. 7 In a medical expert system for
home use, the software places an ailment in one of three categories: (1)
life-threatening emergency situations; (2) problems requiring professional evaluation; and (3) situations likely to self-resolve.' 8 In-home
medical expert systems likely will be used to supplement a regular
health care program and could help mitigate the costs of medical care.
II.

INTRODUCTION TO LIABILITY

When injury results from the use of an expert system, traditional
tort theories apply. Before liability can be traced to some class of
humans, however, many threshold questions must be answered. One
determinative question is whether the system is a product or a service.
If the system is a product, strict liability arguably applies. A defective
product can result from a manufacturing defect or a design defect, an
14. See Nycum, Fong, Snow & Bartlett, Artificial Intelligence and CertainResulting

Legal Issues, 2 COMPUTER LAw. 1, 2 (1985) [hereinafter Nycum & Fong].
15. See Shurkin, supra note 2, at 76. In this test, hundreds of cases from the New
England Journal of Medicine were entered into the program. Panels of physicians and
experts were matched against the computer. Nineteen cases involving 43 different diagnostic problems were chosen. INTERNIST was correct 25 times. The physicians who had
tended the patients were correct 28 times, and clinical experts were correct 35 times.
16. See id.
17. See Comment, supra note 3, at 486.
18. See id. at 487.
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important distinction that is discussed below. If a physician's service accompanies the expert system, the actual cause of the injury might be
the physician's negligence in interpreting the information. In addition,
the expert system might be considered neither a product nor a service
but a hybrid of the two.
Injuries can be traced to patients as individual users, physicians,
distributors, or manufacturers/programmers. Issues of liability surround the physician/hospital and the program manufacturer. In many
cases where and how the program is used will determine the applicable
theory of liability.
For policy reasons, professional medical expert systems and inhome diagnostic systems should be considered products when sold as
turn-key systems (individual hardware systems) to hospitals and consumers. Strict products liability should apply to manufacturing defects
in the programming and production stage. Mistakes in actual design of
the program should be analyzed under a negligence standard.1 9 A negligence or professional liability theory should apply when a physician intervenes and improperly uses or relies upon an expert system.
Negligence or professional liability also is appropriate where a programmer custom designs an expert system for a particular hospital or physician and breaches the duty of care in designing the program.
A.

PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL EXPERT SYSTEMS

Computer systems are used to perform a wide variety of medical
functions that skilled and unskilled individuals once performed.20
Some functions such as the C.A.T. scan (computerized axial tomography) never could be performed manually, while other routine functions
are now computerized -such as appointment scheduling and hospital
bed use or maintaining inventories of drugs and supplies. Programs
such as C.A.T. scans are programs upon which medical personnel routinely rely without questioning their accuracy - no independent
human intervention is expected. Medical procedures increasingly are
controlled by computers including fully-automatic intensive care units
and devices for monitoring such activities as anesthesia administration
and constant reporting to medical personnel. 21 In these situations, a
hospital might be held strictly liable when injury results. However, the
first part of this Note focuses on expert systems used to perform deductive operations, such as computers that interpret laboratory test results,
19. See infra text accompanying notes 70-76 for a more thorough explanation of the
differences between manufacturing defects and design defects.
20. See Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1, at 126.
21. See Freed, Products Liability in the Computer Age, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 270, 273
(1977).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. IX

and expert systems that provide the user with a list of possible diagnoses. In particular, this Note addresses programs that provide information and guidance to physicians.
When a patient is injured because of a physician's incorrect diagnosis or treatment, two types of liability could follow. There could be
strict products liability against the program manufacturer and distributor, if the expert system is considered to be a product and is defective.
Alternatively, there could be negligence liability for the defective program. A plaintiff could recover only if the defendant failed to meet the
appropriate standard of care, and that failure caused the patient's personal injury.22 The negligence action addresses the defendant's conduct
under the circumstances and would be an appropriate cause of action if
23
a medical computer program were classified as a service.
Consequently, one first must ask whether medical diagnostic services are products or services. Some argue that "[m]edical expert system
programs are designed and constructed to augment traditional physician
services. Thus, one of the more persuasive arguments in favor of categorizing an expert system as a service is that these programs practice
medicine. '24 These programs most likely, however, will involve elements of both a service and a product and will be hybrid cases.
B.

IN-HOME DIAGNOSTIC MEDICAL EXPERT SYSTEMS

Liability analysis for in-home expert systems is much less complicated than that of professional systems used by physicians and hospitals.
There is no professional service provided; there is only the purchase of
a mass-produced computer program.
Numerous injuries could result from these systems. For example, a
consumer could be injured by a manufacturing defect in the program
that misdiagnosed his symptoms or misinformed him that his symptoms
were minor when he in fact needed immediate care. An additional
problem might occur when the system misinforms the consumer in an
emergency situation. If an antihistamine were suggested to a person
suffering breathing symptoms without first asking whether the person
had a history of asthma, thyroid disease, or diabetes, the ramifications
could be disastrous.
Injuries resulting from manufacturing defects in these expert systems probably would be subject to strict products liability. This lessens
the plaintiff's burden of proof. Otherwise the plaintiff would not be
able to specify the defect in the program under a negligence standard.
With a strict products liability standard, all parties in the distribution
22. See Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1, at 128.

23. See id.
24. See Comment, supra note 3, at 491.
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chain - manufacturers/programmers and distributors - would be
strictly liable. If, however, the defect were found to be in the program
design, the courts might hold the manufacturer/programmer to only a
negligence standard. 25
III.

PRODUCTS VERSUS SERVICES

The criteria for determining whether expert systems are services or
products include the concepts of tangibility, ownership, possibility for
correcting defects, and method of distribution. 26 In addition to these
criteria, there are many persuasive policy rationales for labeling a system as a service or a product.
A.

TANGIBILITY

Services generally have no tangible existence apart from an end
product that may appear in a tangible form such as a book or diskette.
This end product has no real intrinsic value of its own apart from the
ideas expressed. Conversely, products are tangible, visible items which
hold value in their actual physical characteristics. When the end product of a service takes a tangible form that has a value of its own, the
product-service distinction is more difficult to make. 27
Medical expert diagnostic systems are ideas committed to tangible
form, and their value emerges only when a computer translates the underlying ideas they contain.28 "[T]he streams of electrons produced by
computers, and hence their print-outs and other forms of tangible output, are the results of machine processing in accordance with identifi'29
able steps and, hence, are the equivalents of manufactured goods."
While an expert system developed for professional use is clearly tangible, "its corporeal qualities are only apparent to the physician who uses
the program and are not perceived by the patient.1 30 However, in-home
diagnostic systems have value immediately perceivable by consumers.
"A medical expert system is tangible in nature, yet it is also the end result of the developer's services; it lies in that gray area where product
31
and service merge."
25. See infra text accompanying notes 70-76 for a more thorough explanation of manufacturing and design defects.

26. See Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1.
27. See id at 130.
28. See id.
29. Freed, supra note 21, at 282.
30. Comment, supra note 3, at 490.
31. Id.
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OWNERSHIP

One of the hallmarks of a product is its capacity to be held in one's
possession.3 2 The ownership factor makes a persuasive argument that
professional expert systems are less likely to be classified as products
for purposes of strict liability. In the case of medical expert systems
which are designed for use by medical practitioners and not the general
public, ownership belongs to the physician, not to the injured patient.
"Injuries resulting from a physician's use of an expert system will not
flow from the plaintiff's own direct manipulation of the software, as in
the instance of a program intended for in-home use."' 33 When a computer program is duplicated and sold, it becomes an article of commerce
and a large potential group that can be exposed to personal injury
comes into existence. Thus arguably, in-home diagnostic programs
which are mass produced eventually could be considered items of commerce like food processors or power tools and would be subject to products liability.
C.

POSSIBILITY OF CORRECTING DEFECTS

Defective services only sometimes can be countered by performing
additional services, but the original service no longer exists to be adjusted. On the other hand, products such as machines can be adjusted,
repaired, or altered after production. Computer programs can be
debugged. This alterability makes a program more like a product than
34
a service.
D.

METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION: HYBRID SITUATIONS WHERE PRODUCTS
AND SERVICES ARE COMBINED

One author analogized the computer software market to the market for a suit of clothing. 35 This analogy can be applied to medical expert systems in determining whether they should be considered
products or services. There are three ways that an item reaches the
consumer. First, a suit may be specifically tailored to fit the consumer's
exact measurements. Second, the consumer may buy a ready-to-wear
suit and make no alterations. Third, the consumer may buy a suit that
36
is ready-made but must be altered to fit him.
In the first scenario, consumers are patients and the medical expert
system is specifically tailored for their use. However since in-home di32. See id.
33. Id. at 491.
34. See Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1, at 132.
35. See Conmnent, Negligence: Liability for Defective Software, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 848
(1980).
36. See id. at 853.

1989]

COMPUTER-AIDED MEDICINE

agnostic systems probably will be mass-produced programs, it is unlikely that this analogy applies. The only direct consumers of
specifically-tailored medical systems would be physicians or hospitals,
not patients. Because such expert systems would be developed based on
the specific needs of a hospital or physician, it would be designed for
only their particular uses. Such expert systems really are not placed in
the steam of commerce, because they are distributed to only one customer. Since the product is sold to only one user, the supplier is not in
a better position than the user to bear the costs of defects.3 7 The
programmer is not selling the product en masse and cannot spread the
cost of a defect over a number of consumers on the same scale as a mass
producer. The limited application of this type of system makes it more
like a service than a product, and the appropriate liability is negligence.
A second method of distributing the expert systems parallels the
purchase of a ready-made suit. In this situation, it is not tailored to the
specific user's needs.3 8 This analogy applies to in-home diagnostic medical expert systems that are mass produced as "canned software" as well
as to prepackaged diagnostic systems such as INTERNIST and MYCIN,
which hospitals and physicians use. Since these mass produced products
are placed in the stream of commerce, strict liability is the appropriate
theory of liability. "Ready to use" expert systems represent a method
of distribution analogous to mass distribution of any product.3 9 The objective is to sell the identical program to as many consumers as possible
rather than to one particular user.
Policy rationales for strict liability enter into this analogy. The
supplier is placing the program into the stream of commerce. Thus, if
the system is defective, the supplier is creating a risk of harm and receiving a profit. Patients and doctors have comparatively little knowledge of the system's internal structure and rely on the supplier's
expertise. The supplier is in a better position both to anticipate the
risks and to bear the cost of an injury. The supplier can calculate insurance costs into the price of an expert system. On the other hand, because medicine is not foolproof, why hold a producer that "practices
medicine" to a standard higher than the professional's standard?
The third type of distribution is a hybrid of the first two. Professional medical expert systems used by physicians fall into this category
because both a service (the physician's professional judgment) and a
product (the expert system) are involved. Injury can result in two
ways: (1) a defective program is used while providing a service, or inversely, (2) a correctly manufactured program is used, but is interpreted
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 854.
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or relied on improperly. Those medical expert systems that are intended for general in-home use do not fall into this category, because no
additional service, such as by an intervening physician, is rendered once
the program is reproduced for mass distribution. "By contrast, when a
physician uses a medical expert system the product is inseparable from
the service transaction. ' 40 Categorizing the transaction as hybrid leaves
the standard of liability (negligence or strict liability) undetermined.
This indeterminateness provides leeway for courts to use discretion in
complicated situations where varying standards of liability might be
appropriate.
E.

LIABILITY IN HYBRID SITUATIONS WHERE SERVICES AND PRODUCTS

ARE COMBINED

In determining the standard of liability to apply when a defective
product is used while providing a service, courts generally examine
three elements: (1) the nature of the activity; (2) whether the defective
product was physically conveyed or merely used in providing a service;
and (3) whether the service or the product was the primary focus of the
bargain. 4 1 In Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Associates,42 the
court confirmed the settled rule in California that "where the primary
objective of a transaction is to obtain services, the doctrines of implied
'43
warranty and strict liability do not apply.
In numerous cases where a patient was injured due to a defective
instrument used by a medical professional during the course of treatment, the courts do not apply strict products liability to the doctor using
the instrument." In Magrine v. Krasnica,45 a hypodermic needle broke
in a dental patient's jaw. The court found that the dentist was in no
better position than the patient to control, inspect, and discover the defect. The essence of the relationship was for professional services and
skill, and the dentist did not put the item into the stream of commerce. 46 The court concluded that liability should be placed on the
manufacturer.
40. Comment, supra note 3, at 494.
41. See W. PROSSER & P. KEATON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 104 at 720 (5th
ed. 1984).
42. Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assoc., 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr.
259 (1972).
43. Id. at 855, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
44. See Note, Strict Products Liability and Computer Software: Caveat Vendor, 4
COMPUTER/L.J. 373, 381 (1983).

45. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), aff'd sub nom.,
Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd per curiam,
53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
46. See 94 N.J. Super. at 234-35, 227 A.2d at 543.
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Alternatively, a patient may bring a negligence cause of action in
these hybrid situations. The patient claims not that the professional expert system was defective, but that the physician used it improperly or
negligently. The focus of this negligence cause of action would be that
the professional service itself, and not the product used, was somehow
inadequate. 47 "The physician's reasonable reliance on the functioning
of a program is all that normally can be required. If he or she unrea4s
sonably relies on a program, liability would be based on negligence."
"The physician is expected to use his or her support materials in a critical way and not to rely on them without using independent judgment. '4 9 An example of this type of situation is Barbee v. Rogers,50
where plaintiff claimed eye injuries caused by the improper fitting of
contact lenses. Plaintiff did not prove that the contact lenses were
flawed,5 ' but that the defendants (two optometrists) incorrectly fitted
the lenses to his eyes. 52 The Texas Supreme Court segregated the product from the service. Since the defect arose from the service portion,
53
policy considerations did not mandate imposition of strict liability.
A claim that a physician improperly used an expert medical system
in diagnosing a patient should be governed by negligence or professional
liability. Because expert systems may be more reliable than human
judgment, it is conceivable that physicians could be held liable for not
relying upon expert system advice. For example, one function of the
INTERNIST system is to provide a checklist that helps the user make
54
certain that a diagnostic possibility was not overlooked.
IV.

THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION

If the courts decide that professional medical expert systems are actually services, the injured patient could bring a negligence cause of action against the physician or, alternatively, against the programmer for
providing a defective service. The plaintiff's burden of proof in negligence is more rigorous than in strict liability.5 5 A negligence cause of
action is more difficult for the plaintiff to prove, because he must show
the precise step in the process that caused the defect and prove that a
failure to use sufficient care caused the defect. The courts should con47.
48.
Super.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See Comment, supra note 3, at 496.
Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1, at 142. See also Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J.
223, 241 A.2d (App. Div. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d (1969).
Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1, at 139.
Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968).
See id. at 346.
See id. at 343-44.
See id. at 346.
See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 368.
See infra text accompanying notes 67-80 for a discussion of strict liability.
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strue professional medical diagnostic expert systems as services only
when they are individually tailored to a specific task. Thus, negligence
or professional liability (malpractice) would be applicable only to (1)
physicians for improper use or unreasonable reliance (or non-reliance
on) the expert system, or (2) to manufacturers for design defects in
those systems specifically tailored for a hospital or physician.
Addressing the issue of what constitutes proper reliance, two authors analogized professional medical computer programs to navigational charts which convert data into a more accessible or usable form,
56
the results of which may be passed on for professional evaluation.
The professional must be able to rely on the data's accuracy but is expected to use his professional judgment in evaluating the information,
not blindly rely on the computer or the charts. For example, if a program were designed to flag certain test results, a physician would be
justified in relying on this signal. However, if the patient had a certain
susceptibility that ordinarily would not elicit a computer alert, the physician must supplement the program results with his own etiological
57
and diagnostic expertise.
The negligence cause of action requires that the plaintiff prove "(1)
the existence of a duty of care, (2) conduct below the appropriate standard of care, and (3) a [proximately] resulting injury that should be
compensated by damages." 58 Proving who in the process of creating the
computer program is responsible for the defect is a very heavy burden
of proof for an injured plaintiff. Perhaps the only way to show that the
defendant breached his duty of care is to produce an expert witness
who can delineate the precise location and cause of the defect, i.e., precisely what the allegedly negligent manufacturer failed to do and the
exact circumstances. 59 "This burden might include pointing out the
very mistake among the thousands of bits of information in the program and proving that injury is reasonably foreseeable. This would
have to be done although the injured person might have no idea how or
why a computer operates." 60 The shortcut of res ipsa loquitur probably
would not apply to assist the plaintiff with the burden of proof. Given
the complexities of computers, one cannot say that errors usually do not
61
occur in the absence of negligence.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1, at 131.
See id.
Id. at 133.
See Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.

L.J. 173, 190 (1981).
60. Comment, Computer Software and Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 439, 441 (1983).
61. See Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS COM-

PUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1979).
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In addition to the negligence theory that attaches to a medical expert system classified as a service, physicians and program manufacturers might be subject to a professional liability theory. Under this
theory, a plaintiff seeks recovery for injuries caused by negligently delivered professional services. Although at present no case or standard
exists for a computer program, negligence theory is often applied in
medical situations. "According to this standard, practitioners of the
healing arts are required not only to exercise ordinary reasonable care
in what they do but are also required to possess a minimum level of
medical skill and knowledge. '62 A physician is held to the same degree
of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by
members of their profession under similar circumstances. 63
Policy rationales favorable to strict liability are not incongruent
when applied to professional liability. In terms of risk spreading, a physician who employs a medical expert system may be in a good position
to shoulder at least some of the burden of patient injuries.64 Also, in
terms of insurance, a physician probably would have malpractice insurance. Concededly, society pays heavily for such insurance in the form
of increased medical bills.
Using a standard of professional liability, one important issue is the
care put into a physician's selection of an expert system. For example,
if a new expert system appeared on the market and a physician
purchased it without first checking the medical community's reaction, a
jury might conclude that the physician was negligent. Alternatively,
since expert systems are innovative, perhaps the standard of liability
should be similar to one where a physician attempts a new procedure in
surgery or new techniques for cancer patients.
Normally, a plaintiff must be in a consensual relationship with a
physician to pursue a medical malpractice claim. This consensual relationship requires actual or implied consent to diagnose and be diagnosed, to treat and be treated. 65 Patients injured by a physician's
misuse of an expert system would fall into this category, since they
clearly would have a mutual consensual relationship to be treated. In
contrast, "the relationship between the user of an in-home expert system and its designer does not meet the requirements of a professional
patient-physician relationship." ' 66
Unlike professional medical liability, which is a well-developed theory of liability, computer malpractice has not been established as a legit62. Comment, supra note 3, at 512.
63. See Qunital v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 159-60, 397 P.2d 161, 164, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 577, 580 (1964).
64. See Comment, supra note 3, at 515.
65. See id. at 512.
66. Id. at 513.
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imate cause of action. If a professional liability standard applies to
manufacturers, it is only speculative. With respect to custom tailored
medical expert systems, when the manufacturers are subjected to a negligence theory they probably will be expected to perform with the same
degree of care as the others in their profession. However, this case is
different from a typical professional liability theory, because the elements of a consensual relationship are lacking between the patient and
the programmer who designs a system exclusively for the hospital or
physician.
V.

THE STRICT LIABILITY CAUSE OF ACTION

The manufacturer of either a professional medical expert system or
an in-home system should be subject to strict products liability when a
patient is injured due to a manufacturing defect. A physician who improperly uses such equipment is subject to a negligence doctrine. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a manufacturer or seller
is strictly liable for any injuries resulting to the ultimate consumer
from a product that is (1) in a defective condition when sold, (2) unreasonably dangerous to the user of consumer, and (3) expected to reach
and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it was sold.6 7 In addition, the Restatement suggests
that liability be imposed when an injury results from the manufacturer
failing to adequately warn of the dangers inherent in the program."
Strict liability is imposed upon manufacturers and sellers even if they
69
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product.
Defects can occur in one of two ways: a manufacturing defect or an error in the design of the product.

A.

DESIGN VERSUS MANUFACTURING DEFECT

Strict liability focuses primarily on manufacturing defects, while
design defects usually are evaluated under a negligence standard. A
manufacturing defect occurs when products are not produced as
designed. After a system is designed, it must be encoded into a workable program. If an error was made during data input or conversion
from source code, or if a flaw was discovered in the physical diskette or
hardware, a manufacturing defect would occur. Manufacturing defects
can render a product unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law when
it deviates from the producer's own safety precautions. 70 Under this
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
68. See id. § 402A comment j.

69. See id. § 402A(2)(b).
70. See Comment, supra note 3, at 507 (citing W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 155, at 178-80 (1979)).
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branch of products liability, the plaintiff has a light burden of proof.
The prima facie case for strict liability for manufacturing defects can be
based on one of three types of evidence: (1) expert testimony pin-pointing the defect which caused the injury, (2) proof of destruction or disappearance of the defective product, or (3) proof of the accident's
circumstances that point to a manufacturing defect. 71 One can argue
that professional expert systems used by physicians involve no direct interaction between the patient and the expert system so the product does
not reach the consumer in its defective condition. It also can be argued
that expert systems are not unreasonably dangerous where a human
must intervene. However, patients as third parties are intended to benefit from these systems. Thus, patients injured by the use of a defective
professional medical expert system or by a defective in-home diagnostic
system would be able to recover without encountering an insurmountable burden of proof.
It is much less difficult to apply strict products liability to manufacturing defects than to design defects. "In the case of a design defect...
an injured consumer must prove that a nondefective design was reasonably available. ' 72 This is a more difficult burden of proof for the plaintiff who must provide expert witnesses who can compare the
reasonableness of design options that were available to the program's
designer. The Uniform Product Liability Act suggests that when a design defect is involved, it really is a case of negligence rather than true
strict liability. 73 With computer programs, this task becomes complicated because of difficulty in distinguishing the design phase (reducing
the cognitive methods and knowledge of experts into algorithms) from
the production phase (actual programming or encoding) and the nearly
impossible task of determining whether a particular program characteristic was a conscious or an inadvertent design choice.74 Before any computer program is released for sale or use, it is perfected through a
process known as debugging. Because most program errors are not discovered until the program is used extensively, this process tests the program repeatedly. Brannigan and Dayhoff suggest that any system used
to perform patient-related functions should be designated a productions
system, so that it would be subjected automatically to strict liability and
thus discourage premature use of a still-defective system. 75 On the
other hand, if society greatly needs the use of expert systems to expedite diagnosis or assist in curing, such delay is a high cost to pay.
Similar to the negligence theory, liability in design defect cases
71. See id. at 508.

72. Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1, at 135.
73. See Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723 (1979).

74. See Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1, at 136.
75. See id.
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turn on the reasonableness in choice of design. "When a jury decides
that the risk of harm outweighs the utility of a particular design ...it is
saying that in choosing the particular design and cost trade-offs, the
manufacturer exposed the consumer to greater risk of danger than he
should have. Conceptually and analytically, this approach bespeaks
negligence. '76 However, one Oregon court placed a greater burden on
the manufacturer than would be applied under a negligence theory, assuming that the manufacturer foresaw the possibility that the product's
design might cause the injury that occurred. 77 Under this holding, the
plaintiff need not show that the manufacturer could foresee the article's
dangerous propensity. Applying this to expert systems, any ordinary
mistakes by data encoders in carrying out the system designer's instructions would qualify as manufacturing defects and would be subject to
strict liability.
B.

DUTY TO WARN

The sale of a product carries with it an implied warranty that the
product is reasonably fit for its intended use. 78 This creates a duty to
warn the ultimate user or consumer of an unsafe product. Since it usually is impossible to completely debug a program, the manufacturer
must warn of possible defects. Nondisclosure of such a risk alone can
put a product in a defective condition. Warnings should be plain and
explicit, but this may be difficult or impossible when it comes to unpredictable bugs. "Unlike the possible adverse side effects that drug manufacturers must warn against.., which can usually be pin-pointed with
some particularity, computer problems must be left somewhat vague
and uncertain. '79 "The warnings must go beyond mere notification that
at some point something might go wrong. They must serve to keep the
program from being unreasonably dangerous by making clear its safe
and proper use."8 0 Thus, the inadequate warning itself might make the
expert system "defective."
VI. POLICY REASONS FOR IMPOSITION OF STRICT LIABILITY
ON MANUFACTURERS/PRODUCERS
Strict liability law developed in response to modern marketing
methods where the consumer relies on the skill and judgment of a dis76. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence to Warranty
to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 610 (1980).

77. See Roach v. Kononen, 264 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 282 (1974).
78. See U.C.C. § 3-318.
79. Gemignani, s-upra note 59, at 192.

80. Nycurn, supra note 61, at 19.
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tant manufacturer.8 1 "Society has decided that it is not too much to ask
that an item not injure people."8 2 Consumer reliance is high in the area
of computers and expert systems, because this technology is beyond the
comprehension of the average consumer. The manufacturer/developer
of the expert system is far more informed than users and consumers
about risks of errors. Consequently, the manufacturer is in a better position to avoid the harm, either by extensive debugging or by purchase
of insurance. Yet due to the complexity of all but very elementary programs, it is nearly impossible to debug a program completely.8 3 Nevertheless, the manufacturer can spread the cost of an injury by adjusting
the system's selling price. The cost of insurance can be absorbed into
the system's price. On the other hand, insurance is not always available. When it is available, it may make the product prohibitively expensive. Nevertheless, the manufacturer placed these systems into the
stream of commerce in order to earn a profit so it is justifiable to require him to bear the risk of injury.8 4 "If, indeed, a technology is so sophisticated that no one fully understands or is able to control it, but is
so necessary that modern society must employ it, then it would seem
that the risks inherent in its use ought to be spread evenly among all
the users. Such risk spreading is one of the principal goals of strict liaavailable to the pubbility."'8 5 Also, making diagnostic expert systems
86
lic, implicitly assures that the product is safe.
Categorizing an expert system as a product which is subject to strict
liability would reduce uncertainty about who is liable and would promote responsible action by manufacturers.8 7 "Under a negligence theory, there are widely differing standards of care for manufacturers and
sellers, based on different standards of care in each field."8 8 Under
strict liability, however, every defendant in the distribution chain would
be liable to an injured consumer. The strict liability standard alleviates
many of the plaintiff's burdens that are inherent in the negligence standard. "Because doctors are often loathe to provide evidence that may
compromise a colleague, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to secure expert physician testimony to support a claim."'8 9 On the other hand,
81. See Note, supra note 44, at 390.
82. Id.
83. See Freed, supra note 21, at 275.
84. It should be noted that the manufacturer is found liable only if it can be shown
that but for the malfunction, the patient would not have been injured.
85. Gemignani, supra note 59, at 197.
86. See Comment, supra note 35, at 850.
87. See Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1, at 133.
88. Id.
89. Comment, supra note 3, at 516.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. IX

strict liability may deter the continued production of much needed expert systems.
The rationales for using a strict liability standard become more persuasive when applied to the field of medical care and the preservation
of life. While the practice of medicine is an imperfect science, manufacturers should be expected to perform thorough testing. "Judicious use
of conditional statements and error checking codes can greatly minimize the chance of danger to life." 9 Arguably, if imposition of strict liability in tort would force computer hardware and software
manufacturers to be more careful in the race to develop an ultimate
product, this alone would justify its application. 91 On the other hand,
one might argue that irrespective of the liability standard, given the
free market's inherent checks and balances physicians would not use
expert systems unless they were safe, and manufacturers could not sell
systems that the medical community did not approve. However, until
these programs become more widely used, it will be impossible for physicians to know in advance how safe they really are.
A.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST STRICT LIABILITY FOR MANUFACTURERS

"[I]ndividual physicians have an effective monopoly, enforced by
the legal system, on primary medical decisionmaking. Physicians have
jealously guarded their control . . . of diagnosing and treating dis-

eases." 92 In-home diagnostic expert systems would encroach upon this
monopoly, resulting in less expensive medical care for patients. Medical
expert systems would help bypass the monopoly of medical expertise.
Consequently, a strict liability standard might deter manufacturers
from producing systems and thus reinforce the physician's traditional
monopoly. "If courts continue to apply strict liability, it may dampen
industry enthusiasm for greater use of technology." 9 3 Imposing strict liability on manufacturers of expert systems may stifle innovation, as
does the federal regulation on drug development. "The consequences
are ironic: a system designed to eliminate bad products now drives vital
products from the market. '94 Many scientists and lawyers oppose imposition of the strict liability standard to important innovative products.
One lawyer/engineer asserts that "[t]oday technology itself is put on
trial.",95 96 Because large established corporations could self-insure in90. Note, supra note 44, at 396.

91. See Gemignani, supra note 59, at 204.
92. Brannigan & Dayhoff, Medical Informatics, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 3 (1986).
93. Nycum & Fong, supra note 14, at 5.
94. Walsh & Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State Tort Law Drug
Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG & COSMETIC L.J. 171, 178 (1986).
95. Huber, Memo to Scientists: Stop Innovating!, SCIENTIST, Jan. 11, 1988, at 13.

96. Id.

1989]

COMPUTER-AIDED MEDICINE

novative endeavors, strict liability would concentrate production of new
computer systems among leading firms, and force out smaller producers
who could not find or afford insurance.
Two defenses to strict liability are product misuse and assumption
of the risk. Mere use of a complicated expert system by one without
expertise in the specific area might constitute an implied assumption of
the risk. Due to the high risk of failure and the arguably intolerable
burden on computer manufacturers 97 to protect against these risks,
manufacturers may insist on a total liability disclaimer. Like the warning on a cigarette package, warning of this high risk could insulate manufacturers from strict liability for malfunctions. 98 "In the case of a
medical expert system designed for physician use, imposition of strict liability upon the practitioner user may actually discourage physicians
from using expert systems as a means of double-checking and verifying
diagnoses and planned treatments." 99
VII.

POLICY REASONS WHY PHYSICIANS AND HOSPITALS
SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO STRICT LIABILITY

The reasons for applying strict products liability to hospitals and
physicians are outweighed by opposing reasons. The first step in determining liability is deciding whether the hospital is the manufacturer or
the purchaser of the program. One argument states that a hospital is in
a position to inspect a program upon delivery and also when it is modified or repaired; it selects the program initially and can readily protect
itself through insurance. 1°° In most cases where injured patients have
sued hospitals, courts rejected strict liability for injuries caused by medical products supplied by hospitals, and held the product manufacturer
liable rather than the hospital. 10 1 However, if the hospital itself was
the manufacturer of the expert system, there would be no reason for
not treating it like any other manufacturer. Arguably, strict liability
would not prevent the risks that negligence law currently does not
cover. It also can be argued that holding doctors and other medical professionals strictly liable could actually reduce the quality of medical
care because they would have less incentive to purchase time saving
102
equipment.
Overall, the best theory of liability for a physician's use of a defec97.
98.
99.
100.

See Gemignani, supra note 59, at 201.
See id.
Comment, supra note 3, at 518.
See Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1, at 138-39.

101. See id. at 140. See also Morris, Physician and Hospital Liability for Defective

Products Used in the Treatment of Patients,46 INS. COUNSEL J. 566 (1979).
102. See Comment, Computer Software and Strict ProductsLiability, 20 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 439, 450 (1983).
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tive expert system is professional negligence. A defect in a medical expert system does not immediately produce an injury. The harm results
when the physician fails to realize that the program's diagnosis or suggested treatment is inaccurate and proceeds with the system's suggestions.' 0 3 "The bare fact that the physician relies upon a medical expert
system in arriving at the wrong conclusions - rather than making an
error based on personal knowledge - should not convert what would
be liability for negligence into strict liability." 1° 4 Also, a patient contracts for the physician's services, and the physician is not using the system to earn a profit. However, it might be argued that he is using the
expert system to save time and increase accuracy, and thus enhance his
earnings per unit of time which does make him an entrepreneur, like
the manufacturer. Nevertheless, "forcing a physician to internalize
higher insurance costs under a strict liability standard will contribute to
an increase in medical expenses that may be unwarranted."' 0 5
Such potential liability would thwart use and development of expert systems. If physicians were subject to strict liability when using
expert systems, then they might refuse to use these systems and instead
research medical records by hand and use medical books for diagnostic
purposes. This would cost patients more money as more time is spent.
It is arguably economically more efficient to hold the physician to a
negligence or professional liability standard for his service in interpreting the expert system's advice. In addition, under a professional negligence standard, res ipsa loquitur aids the plaintiff's burden of proof.
With res ipsa loquitur,if the expert system is found to be nondefective,
then the only reasonable conclusion is that the physician was negligent
in his professional judgment. Physicians also might be held negligent in
using a defective system if they knew or should have known that it was
defective. Finally, if the expert system was defective, the plaintiff could
recover from the manufacturer separately on a products liability theory.
VIII.

COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND THE NEW BIOLOGY

The previous legal analysis and policy considerations can be applied
to injuries resulting from computer systems used in the area of the new
biology. Are these systems considered services or products? Many of
the same questions and policy considerations applied above will be instrumental in determining the most appropriate standard of liability.
An expert system already has been developed to handle one area of
the new biology: the role of consent in medical ethics. Although computer systems have not reached the sophistication of the expert systems
103. See Comment, supra note 3, at 497.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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used for medical judgment, they are presently utilized in procuring organs donated for transplantation. Another area where use of an expert
system or computer networking system someday might be utilized is
surrogate parenting. It is likely that a surrogate searching and matching system would incorporate functions of the existing expert systems
used for consent as well as a networking service.
A.

EXAMPLE OF A NEW BIOLOGY EXPERT SYSTEM

The British Medical Association, with the endorsement of the Central Ethical Committee published COMET (an acronym for Consent to
Medical Treatment), the first expert system to incorporate a comprehensive set of rules of law and medical ethics relating to consent to
medical treatment.106 COMET does not address many controversial
topics such as euthanasia, human procreation, or abortion; it deals only
with the legal and moral obligations of the medical professional involved in the case.10 7 COMET uses over one hundred rules and is configured as an interactive question-and-answer program. Once the
system acquires enough information through its questioning, it reaches
a final conclusion on whether it would be ethical for the medical professional to treat the patient in the circumstances described.
On its opening screen, COMET announces the names of its authors
and publisher, explains the program's limitations, and sets forth what
appears to be a disclaimer stating that the user is ultimately responsible
for making decisions; at the end of each session a postscript explains
that the user may well disagree with the system's reasoning and should
therefore discuss the case with teachers or colleagues.108 One author
describing COMET held this opinion as to the liability issue:
"Like all expert computer systems, COMET can only be an aid, either
for teaching or for decision-making. In any real case, a decision affecting the life or health of others can only be made by the individuals
whom the law authorizes to make it, and the responsibility for making
such decisions, and for their consequences, is theirs and theirs
alone."

10 9

Also programmed into COMET is a bias against medical intervention
when there is any question about the legal or ethical position of consent
to treat. Its authors have suggested that COMET will be useful as a
teaching aid for medical students to familiarize themselves with the
questions that ought to be asked and as an aid to doctors in difficult
106. See Sieghart & Dawnson, Computer Aided Medical Ethics, J. MEDICAL ETHICS
185, 185 (1987).

107. See id.
108. See id. at 187.
109. Id.
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cases. The program is written in BASIC language, is available on diskette, and can be purchased by mail from London.
The COMET expert system is packaged as a finished product in a
tangible diskette. It is available by mail-order and placed in the stream
of commerce. Arguably, it is a product and should be subject to strict
products liability. However, whether or not that liability extends beyond the physical diskette rests a good deal upon how its disclaimer will
be interpreted. Its advice is directed solely to medical personnel and because of its bias against medical treatment when consent is uncertain,
injury would result only in the case of nontreatment. Since a physician's professional judgment is required, this arguably breaks the chain
of causation necessary for strict liability. However, if medical personnel
rely upon COMET as a standard tool, it may achieve the status of any
other medical instrument, and then the manufacturer's liability for injury due to a manufacturing defect might be similar to the liability of a
manufacturer of a defective scalpel.1 10
B.

COMPUTER NETWORKING SYSTEM FOR ORGAN TRANSPLANTS

Organ transplantation is one area of the new biology that presently
employs a computer system to assist in searching for donors. About ten
years ago, Jean-Francois Borel discovered the drug Cyclosporin. This
drug inhibits the donee's rejection of transplanted organs without destroying the body's ability to fight infection. Since the drug minimizes
the danger of rejection, the demand for organs has rapidly increased.1 1 '
The medical profession has realized the need for a fair and equitable system of distribution. In the past, media campaigns by families,
pleading for organs to save a loved one's life were necessary. "[H]ow
deftly someone [could] manipulate the media to get public attention"
2
often determined who lived and who died."1
In response to this need for fair and equitable distribution and procurement of organs, the United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS"),
a non-profit organization, was developed. The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984113 (the "1984 Act") gave the Secretary of Health and
Human Services authority to assure the establishment and operation of
an organ procurement and transplantation registry and provided federal
110. See Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), aff'd sub noma.,
Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd per curiam,
53 N.J. Super. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969) (the manufacturer of a defective hypodermic needle should be liable, not the dentist).
111. See Chapman, The Life-and-Death Question of an Organ Market, FORTUNE, Jun.
11, 1984, at 111.

112. Id.
113. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2339.
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grants to organ procurement organizations. In 1986, the federal government awarded UNOS a contract to establish the Organ Procurement
Transplant Network ("OPTN"), a nationwide computer networking system. To accomplish this, UNOS utilizes the VAX computer system
(manufactured by Digital Equipment Corporation).
Regional organ procurement agencies register with UNOS to gather
information on every possible donor and recipient. A single national
priority list for particular organs is produced based on the recipients'
medical status, blood type, antigenic types, length of time on the waiting
list, and logistics. 11 4 A matching system accompanies the computerized
registry of potential recipients. This links available organs with recipients and provides a national, coordinated mechanism for efficient distribution of all available organs. 115 The law requires hospitals with
transplant centers and facilities for organ donations to become members
116
of UNOS in order to receive Medicare and Medicaid payments.
Although the federal government closely regulates the UNOS organiza117
tion, the 1984 Act does not insulate the organization from liability.
The UNOS organ networking system has become an established
tool in aiding physicians and hospital personnel, but who is liable when
something goes wrong? 118 Since hospitals must register with UNOS, a
physician who fails to use the system would be held liable for professional malpractice under the doctrine of negligence per se. Policy rationales similar to those that apply when a physician negligently uses or
fails to use a diagnostic expert system apply here. To encourage use
and development of this program, physicians must comply with established practices.
It is imperative not to apply too stringent a liability standard to the
computer system manufacturer, because authorization of the grant program is based on a three-year appropriation. If the federal government
should decide to contract with a different organization in the future, it
is important not to inhibit competition among organizations. If one
company was held strictly liable for a malfunction that led to an improperly matched or unprocured organ, other manufacturers would be
114. Telephone interview with Kelly Straw, Public Relations Department, United Network for Organ Sharing (Mar. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with UNOS].
115. See S. REP. No. 98-382, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs 3975, 3978 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
116. Telephone Interview with UNOS, supra note 114.
117. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-1127 (1984), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3989, 3940.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 3,4. This Note focuses on the liability pertaining to two classes of defendants - manufacturers of the computer systems and the doctors and/or hospitals that use them. It should be noted that there are many additional
intermediary parties, such as tissuing labs, that could be held negligent in the handling or
distribution of information to UNOS.
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discouraged from developing comparable computer systems. Irrespective of the inhibiting effects strict liability likely would procure, the
VAX system is arguably a computerized service (not a product) and
thus subject to a negligence doctrine. Because the networking system
requires constant input and flow of new data, it is arguably a service,
rather than a product. The essence of the system is not a tangible,
mass-produced, finished product, but an on-going service. Hospitals do
not own the system; they pay user fees. Although one can argue that
the system is put into a stream of commerce, this stream is strictly confined to hospitals and medical personnel. When such a service is involved, negligence is the appropriate theory of liability.
C.

COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND SURROGATE PARENTING

In addition to consent to medical treatment, another new biology
area which involves a myriad of legal and ethical questions is surrogate
parenting. A computer service developed in this field of medicine could
borrow ideas for function capabilities from both COMET (an expert system) and VAX (a computer networking system). Before a physician offers services in a surrogacy case, a large number of medical and ethical
questions must be answered. Questions to be considered might be: Is
the adopting woman unwilling to gestate her own children? Is she biologically incapable of bearing children? Have the appropriate tests confirmed this? Is she emotionally unable to handle her own pregnancy?
Or would the rigors of pregnancy interfere with her career? The format of these questions will have to wait for specific legislative
enactments.
Some states do not permit money to change hands in a surrogate
arrangement. 119 In its report to the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, the Ethics Advisory Board 120 unanimously agreed that alternative forms of reproduction could be obtained only if certain specific items of information were identified, such as the availability of
potential effective alternative therapies. 121 The California Civil Code,
for example, requires the supervision of a licensed physician for artificial insemination and the consent of the mother's husband; it treats the
122
semen donor as if he were not the natural father.
When legislative guidelines are settled for surrogate parenting, an
expert system designed to ascertain whether a surrogate relationship
119. See Doe v. Kelly, Cir. Ct. of Wayne County, Michigan (1980) (quoted in SHAPIRO
& SPENCE, CASES MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON BIOETHICS AND LAW 537-542 (1981)).

120.
121.
search
35,041,
122.

45 C.F.R. § 46.204 (1987).
See Ethics Advisory Board (HEW) Report and Conclusions: HEW Support of ReInvolving Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033,
35,045-46 (1979).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(a) (West Supp. 1988).
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conforms to legal and ethical standards may be developed. Using
COMET as a prototype, the system could use an interactive questionand-answer format to aid a physician in deciding whether to assist in a
surrogate arrangement. Like COMET, this type of expert system could
be sold as a finished product in the form of a diskette with legal
changes updated by supplements.
If surrogacy becomes an established practice, expert systems may
be useful not only in monitoring procedures once a surrogate has been
found, but also in initially searching for the surrogate. Data, such as a
surrogate's race, RH factor, geographic location, and genetic history,
could be matched with an adopting couple's specific requests. This data
could be prioritized using the expert system's deductive principles to
find the most suitable surrogate. A list could be generated to aid the
physician in narrowing the search for a suitable gestator, similar to the
INTERNIST system 123 which generates a list of possible diagnoses.
Like the search for compatible organs, the search for surrogate
mothers could be developed into a networking agency which receives
and coordinates information from both adopting parents and surrogate
mothers. Because the search for a compatible surrogate is not a life and
death situation and does not require the speed essential in the search
for organs, the federal government probably will not assume control
and funding of this practice. In addition, while surrogate parenting is a
developing practice, it is estimated that as much as ten percent of our
population may be candidates at some time for transplantation surgery. 124 Because of its smaller scope, surrogate searching agencies presumably would develop as private organizations. As independent
private services, liability will be a crucial issue in inhibiting or encouraging development of computerized networks.
Arguably, if an expert system that mimics COMET is used to ascertain legal and ethical concerns in surrogacy, it also would be subject to
strict liability if distributed as a product. Yet as with COMET, if a disclaimer is used and a physician must intervene to interpret the data,
this arguably breaks the chain of causation for strict liability.
With respect to the computer networking services, a physician who
negligently relies on data offered by the computer service without using
his own professional judgment or performing his own tests could be
held liable for professional malpractice in the event of injury to the surrogate or infant (i.e., injuries from overlooked genetic defects or blood
type incompatibilities). Providing this service to trained medical personnel, the manufacturers displace liability to the physician who must
intervene and use his professional judgment to decide whether the sur123. See supra text accompanying note 15.
124. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 115, at 3985.
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rogate is medically acceptable. Yet until such networking services are
established, public policy may dictate that a more liberal negligence
standard should apply, such as when a physician attempts a new procedure in surgery or an experimental cancer treatment. Perhaps such a
standard would hold a doctor liable only if he were grossly negligent or
displayed intentional misconduct.
Could the computer system manufacturer be held to a products liability standard if the computers routinely mismatched RH types? Since
a surrogate searching service is arguably a service and not a product,
probably not. Unlike COMET, this is not a static, finished, tangible
product, and if a plaintiff actually could pinpoint the defect to this hypothesized degree, he could recover on a negligence theory. Manufacturers and suppliers of this system probably would supply only to
hospitals and licensed physicians rather than to the general public. Policy also dictates that surrogate searching services be subjected to a negligence standard rather than to a strict liability standard.
Manufacturers of computer systems used in this service probably would
be unable to find or afford liability insurance to cover the risks involved. If, due to error in an expert system, a surrogate was improperly
matched and gave birth to a defective child, an entire class of plaintiffs
would bring suit - the adopting parents, the surrogate parent, the
child's guardian ad litem, and perhaps the state, which might be required to provide for the child's care. To further encourage development of a networking system and to comply with policy concerns, a
negligence standard might even be too inhibiting. Because the area is so
new, manufacturers may be unable to obtain liability insurance. A liberal negligence standard which requires the manufacturer to develop
the system in good faith, without gross negligence or intentional misconduct would encourage development of this important tool. Under a
liberal negligence standard, a jury would be instructed to relax the due
care element.
With respect to both an expert system designed to ascertain
whether a surrogate relationship conforms to legal and ethical standards and computer networking systems, physicians held to a professional negligence theory might refuse to use these systems if it would
entail an added risk of liability. They would espouse the theory that
"Americans can't afford to correct or improve upon our current stores
of knowledge. The Wright brothers wouldn't get off the ground today."'125 Unlike established diagnostic systems which truly perform
traditional diagnostic functions and like the Wright brothers, these expert systems and services embark upon an entirely new field in
medicine. Thus, to encourage development of this new technology, a li125. Huber, supra note 95, at 13.
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ability standard should inspire maximum care without inhibiting
development.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The utilization of computers in medicine has brought increased accuracy, efficiency, and life-saving technologies to this area of science.
However, computer-aided medicine also can contribute to an increased
risk of injury, particularly when humans rely on computers too much.
Diagnostic expert systems, which mimic the cognitive methods of experts, are especially vulnerable to over-reliance.
When a professional diagnostic expert system or an in-home system
causes injury to a patient or consumer because of a manufacturing defect, the manufacturer should be held to a strict products liability standard. Manufacturers also are liable for defects in design; however, this
is a modified version of strict liability, more closely resembling negligence. If the injury resulted from negligence in the physician's professional judgment, then a plaintiff is limited to a professional negligence
theory against the physician. A negligence standard is also the appropriate cause of action when a system is custom-made for a hospital or
physician. Arguably, when a computer system is specifically tailored for
one consumer, it should be classified as a programmer's service, not a
mass-produced product. Computers also are making their way into new
areas of medicine. As with diagnostic systems, when an expert system
in this field takes the form of a mass-produced product, strict liability is
the appropriate cause of action to bring against manufacturers. Conversely, if the computer system is really an on-going service operation, a
negligence standard applies.
In determining the theory of liability that legally and ethically is
most appropriate, many variables are involved. These variables include
whether the computer system is a service or a product; whether the defect is one of design or manufacture; whether the party at issue is best
situated to prevent injury; the affordability and availability of insurance; customer expectations; and whether the intervention of a physician breaks the chain of causation. The applicable liability theories
ideally should provide incentives to doctors and manufacturers to maximize safety while at the same time stimulate innovation and reduce the
cost of medical care.
Hope Mortimer

